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Hanoi, Vietnam
Representing power in and of the nation
William S. Logan
Taylor and Francis
Hanoi, like most capital cities, performs functions at three levels. It is home to its residents
and provides local level services for them. But it also has a role as a city for all citizens of the
Vietnamese state, performing capital city functions across the entire national territory as well
as beyond national borders. Hanoi is especially interesting because of the uneasy way in
which it has been forced to share power internally with Ho Chi Minh City in the south—
Hanoi maintaining political and cultural sway but its rival becoming stronger in economic
and demographic terms. Externally, it has struggled for recognition, having been regarded
as capital of a weak political state open to the interventions of the Chinese, French, Americans
and the Soviet Union. This paper argues that Hanoi’s double vulnerability has made its
rulers acutely aware of the need to demonstrate the city’s power as a capital city—or at least
to give the semblance of power—through urban planning and architectural design, the
building of heroic monuments and the naming of city features after key historic events and
people. Major events and projects have become an important way in which the Vietnamese
government has sought to strengthen Hanoi’s place—and hence its own—in the national
consciousness. The regime also continues to push on with efforts to make a future Hanoi
dominant both within the Vietnamese urban hierarchy and as the country’s undisputed
international metropolis.
Post-reunification Hanoi: power within 
the nation
n this paper, I argue that the intercon-
nections between ideological values and
urban environment are well demon-
strated by the short post-colonial story
from 1954. Following two wars of indepen-
dence, first against French (1946–64) and
second against Americans (1964–72), the
nationalists, by then socialist in orienta-
tion, reunified the country in 1975 and
Hanoi resumed its role as political capital of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Despite
colonialism, as also despite the earlier
millennium of Chinese rule, essential
Vietnamese cultural elements had managed
to survive, especially in rural areas from
where they were re-implanted in the cities
after 1945 (see Logan, 2000, p. 43). History
and archaeology were officially reinter-
preted to tell a different national story, and
all the place names were changed to honour
national and revolutionary figures. Rue
Henri Rivière (captain who had success-
fully taken the Hanoi citadel in 1882)
became Pho Ngo Quyen (10th-century
general who defeated the Chinese at the
battle of Bach Dang); Boulevard Amiral
Courbet (leader of the fleet involved in the
French conquest of Tonkin) became Pho Ly
Thai To (first king of independent Later Ly
dynasty 1009–1225 and founder of Hanoi);
Paul Bert Square became Indira Gandhi
square to acknowledge the Indian Prime
Minister’s pro-Soviet leaning.
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But enough French elements remained
to create a distinctively hybrid modern
Vietnamese urban culture: words like ga
(French ‘gare’ = station), ô-to (auto =
motor car), ga-to (gâteau = cake) and pho-
ma (fromage = cheese) had permanently
entered the everyday language while
hybridity is a striking feature of cuisine,
dress, painting and architecture. During
the years 1955–90, a socialist layer was
added, with major urban planning and
architectural influences deriving from the
USSR and other Eastern European coun-
tries because of the Hanoi regime’s decision
to join the Soviet bloc. Again this impact
was largely absorbed into the hybrid mix as
seen, for instance, the Soviet–Vietnamese
Friendship Cultural Palace. The same
hybridity is seen in urban planning, as in
the Master Plan Hanoi 1990–2010 which the
Hanoi People’s Committee and its Office of
the Chief Architect completed in 1993. This
master plan was developed in the manner
developed during the French colonial and
socialist periods and now regarded as the
standard Vietnamese approach; that is, as a
piece of urban design drawn up by archi-
tects and engineers, dependent on central-
ized decision-making and, like the five-year
plans in the economic sphere, drawn up at
long intervals, too inflexible for such a
rapidly growing city.
Because it was the national capital, the
stylistic choices made by government-
employed architects and planners in the post-
war period were often aimed at impressing
with a monumentalism designed to reflect
the power of the state and its ideology. The
most prominent of these constructions is Ho
Chi Minh’s mausoleum at the apex of urban-
ist Ernest Hébrard’s three proposed grand
boulevards, the very point at which the
French had planned the entrance to the new
Governor-General’s palace. Other socialist
monuments are the parade square, the Ho
Chi Minh museum, the Lenin statue, the
State Assembly, the headquarters of the
Vietnamese Communist Party and former
Soviet bloc embassies. This redesign of Ba
Dinh Square was consistent with the socialist
principles established in the Soviet Union;
certainly a central square focusing on a dead
heroic leader’s mausoleum and acting as a
political rallying point had become a stan-
dard feature of socialist capital city planning
and could be found in Moscow (Red Square),
Beijing (Tiananmen Square) and Sofia
(Georgi Dmitrov Square).
Hanoi also re-emerged as a result of politi-
cal processes as the cultural heart of the
Vietnamese nation, the communist regime
effectively promoting itself as reflecting true
Vietnamese values, however hybrid they were
in reality, whereas Saigon remained tainted by
Western political influences and Hue was seen
as representing feudal imperialism (Long,
2003; Logan, 2006). After reunification, the
Hanoi regime quickly saw that its attempts
to impose collectivization on the farmers of
the South and de-commercialization onto
Saigon business people were not going to
work and they were abandoned by the end of
the 1970s. In 1986, the Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party Congress, the supreme agenda-
setting forum, decided to open up to the West
under a doi moi (renovation) policy. By 1992,
the Party agreed to remove the enormous
portrait of Ho Chi Minh from the top of the
State Bank in central Hanoi, a recognition that
economic prosperity was most likely to be
achieved through re-engagement with capital-
ism rather than an insistence on socialist
purity.
Belying its change of name from Saigon
to Ho Chi Minh City, the socialist impact
on the southern city was always far less
dramatic than on cities of the North. Social-
ism held sway there for a shorter time—
only since reunification in 1975 and quickly
dwindling in intensity—but there had also
been a shorter period of economic stagna-
tion than in the northern capital. There was
very little development in Hanoi from
1930s to 1990s, whereas Saigon had contin-
ued to develop under the pro-Western
Republic of South Vietnam, especially with
impacts of US aid but also greater presence
of Westerners through military and related
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LOGAN: HANOI 89
R&R programmes. Modern glass curtain
wall buildings dotted the skyline by the
time of reunification and have continued to
multiply more rapidly than in Hanoi. It is
sometimes said that the current wave of
globalization perhaps favours Ho Chi Minh
City economically, notably because of it
earlier harmonious connection with the
USA and its closer proximity to Southeast
Asian growth centres, such as Bangkok and
Singapore. In the same way that Shanghai
appeared to reap the benefits of re-
engagement with capitalism than China’s
political and cultural capital, Beijing, so Ho
Chi Minh City has seemed at an advantage
and to threaten Hanoi’s hold on the coun-
try, at least in the economic sense but
potentially also in terms of political and
cultural influence. This, then, has contrib-
uted to the uneasy relationship that has
sometimes existed between the two cities.
It is true that Ho Chi Minh City’s domi-
nance grew in the early doi moi period. For
instance, in the early 1990s, it is estimated
that Ho Chi Minh City overshadowed
Hanoi, its nearest domestic rival, by a wide
margin, generating six to seven times more
industrial output value and seven times more
foreign trade and had more foreign invest-
ment than the entire northern region put
together (Turley and Womack, 1998, p. 96).
More recently, however, Hanoi is seen to be
catching up and, according to some
measures, overtaking Ho Chi Minh City. Ho
Chi Minh City had always been on top of the
list of cities and provinces receiving Foreign
Direct Investment, which for the entire
country has risen from a total of US$10
billion in 1994 to $40 billion in 2003. But
since 2000, it had been moving down the list
and Hanoi had taken the lead (Vietnam
Economic Times, 2005, p. 18, 156).
What measures has Hanoi been able to use
to keep Ho Chi Minh City’s growth under
control? Such a blunt proposition is not, of
course, a part of official policy, and publicly
available documents therefore neither
confirm nor dismiss it. On the other hand, it
is very clear in terms of both national policy
and daily understanding that Hanoi is the
political centre and Ho Chi Minh City is the
economic centre. Nevertheless, Hanoi is able
to use the national policy-making agenda and
structures to ensure that urban development
does not concentrate too much in Ho Chi
Minh City. In the mid 1990s, according to
Marr, official planning documents declared
that: 
‘The position of Hanoi in the nationwide 
system of cities was to be strengthened and 
the prevailing differences to [sic] Ho Chi 
Minh City accentuated: Hanoi is not only 
the focal point of political power, but also 
that of culture, science and technology.’ 
(2006, p. 287)
Further, Marr maintained, plans were made
to elevate Hanoi to be a ‘national centre of
commerce and finance, its status as capital
symbolic of more or less the whole country’.
Pro-Hanoi politicians and bureaucrats need
to avoid enflaming tensions between the two
cities by hammering home their determina-
tion to put Hanoi ahead of its rival, but,
nevertheless, from time to time official state-
ments make the point explicitly. For instance,
the Vietnam Economic Times’ 2005 publica-
tion Viet Nam: Opportunities for Investors
refers (p. 126) to the target set for 2006 under
the five-year Socio-Economic Plan 2006–10
of ‘making Hanoi the economic, scientific,
cultural and educational centre of the coun-
try’. That this policy bias in favour of Hanoi
was working is suggested by the official
expectation that Hanoi would achieve an
11.5% GDP growth in 2005, compared with
Ho Chi Minh City’s lower 10.4% (Vietnam
Economic Times, 2005, p. 216).
As long as Vietnam remains a communist
state led by the Vietnamese Communist
Party and watchdog bodies such as the
Fatherland Front, Hanoi will maintain its
credentials as the political capital, the city of
nationalism, the revolution and Ho Chi
Minh. Possession of capital city status and
related functions has been critical in main-
taining a degree of economic and demo-
graphic parity with the southern rival. Like
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Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi performs local
level services for its residents, but, while Ho
Chi Minh City has economic influence
nationally, Hanoi has an official role as the
city for all citizens of the Vietnamese state
and performs a set of special functions for the
whole nation. These include services that
extend beyond the national borders such as
diplomatic and consular services relating to
trade, the movement of people and the repre-
sentation of the national culture abroad. Such
national and international capital city func-
tions are crucial for the local economy,
generating significant numbers of jobs and
revenue (Logan, 2006). This special status
also allows the national government, in asso-
ciation with the Hanoi People’s Committee,
to introduce policies and programmes
designed to enhance Hanoi as the chief city
around which Vietnamese identity as a
nation is shaped and which represents the
nation so defined to the world.
Being the seat of government and claiming
to be the cradle of Vietnamese culture, a close
link exists in Hanoi between capital city
building and nation building. It continues to
be critically important for the sense of
nationhood to create a capital worthy of the
nation. Architecture and urban design
continue to contribute to this process, but so,
too, do the arts and education. The Van Mieu
complex houses Vietnam’s first centre of
Confucian learning, a pre-modern university
in fact (Logan and Thuc, 2004), and Hanoi is
now home to a dozen or so major institu-
tions of higher learning. A lively artistic
scene has existed since colonial days and
continues to flourish, with expansion into
new fields of media and entertainment. The
tourism industry thrives on history and
cultural activities, and, with its rich assets,
Hanoi is now racing ahead of Ho Chi Minh
City. Readers of the Travel and Leisure
Magazine rated Hanoi as fourth most attrac-
tive city in Asia in the 2004 World’s Best
Awards (Hotel Online, 2004). An explosion
of hotel construction in Hanoi in the late
1990s has also helped, and Hanoi is achieving
strong occupancy rates (67.8% in 2004, cf.
HCMC 59.9%; Vietnam Economic Times,
2005, p. 153). This adds to the picture of
Hanoi as now the most attractive city for
economic investment.
Hanoi in international relations: 
representing the nation to the world
Hanoi’s 1000th birthday in 2010 is fast
approaching. This occasion provides an
unprecedented opportunity for the national
government to promote the country to the
world, not only its traditional culture but
also its modernization and economic poten-
tial. Since this is a one-party state, this is also
an opportunity to reaffirm the nature of the
political system by demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of its economic, social and cultural
policies. Hanoi’s political legitimacy has
been hard won. Even after its victory in the
American War and success in reunifying the
country, the regime was shunned by some
Western countries, most notably the USA
which, rather than paying the war damage
reparations agreed to in the 1973 Paris
Agreement, imposed instead an economic
embargo on Vietnam. This meant not only
that American companies were outlawed
from dealing with Vietnam but also that
Vietnamese requests for aid through the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank
were vetoed by the US government. Other
Western countries continued to expand trade
and investment links with Vietnam, however,
and eventually the embargo was withdrawn
in 1994 and the American Embassy re-
opened in Hanoi. Vietnamese exiles in the
USA, however, still reject the Hanoi govern-
ment and use the Internet and other means to
criticize and unsettle it. Vietnamese diplo-
matic efforts continue to have a focus on
defending the country against and construct-
ing socialism, but more and more diplomacy
is shifting to facilitating economic develop-
ment (Vietnam Economic Times, 2005, p. 55).
One of the complicating factors that
retarded the achievement of recognition on
the world stage was Vietnam’s invasion
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of   Cambodia in 1978–79 to remove the
murderous Khmer Rouge regime under Pol
Pot. Here Vietnam was seen as the aggressor
by various Western and other UN members
which consequently refused to recognize the
government it installed to replace the Khmer
Rouge. Thailand was one of the Asian
nations rejecting Vietnam’s influence over
Phnom Penh, seeing it as just one more
Vietnamese move into the political vacuum
created by the collapse of the Khmer king-
dom. Thai–Viet rivalry has simmered beneath
the surface for several centuries, boiling over
occasionally into warfare, as in the battles
over the various Lao buffer zone territories in
the 19th century. Even now, Hanoi exerts
strong political influence on its fellow
communist government in Vientiane, strug-
gling to keep Bangkok, with its powerful
economic and electronic communication
links to Laos, under control.
Compounding Chinese concerns about
Vietnam’s policy regarding the Spratly
Islands and the treatment of ethnic Chinese
within Vietnam, the foray into Cambodia led
to severe rebuke from China. The Vietnamese
army was able to rebuff the Chinese troops
that crossed the Vietnamese border in 1979
although with a considerable death toll on
both sides and destruction of towns and agri-
cultural lands. A diplomatic solution was
eventually found in 1999 and the propaganda
machines of both countries claim victory. If
the view that China’s ultimate objective was
to take or at least directly threaten Hanoi is
given any credence, it reinforces the need
perceived by the Vietnamese government to
convince the world of its legitimacy. In recent
years, the government has employed the
common practice of using major events and
projects as a way to maintain Hanoi’s place—
and hence its own—in the national and inter-
national consciousness. Hanoi has hosted
several ASEAN meetings and, in December
2003, the Southeast Asian Games. The first
major international meeting was the Franco-
phonie conference which Hanoi hosted in
November 1997. Through it Hanoi sought to
bolster the dwindling links with France and
the French-speaking world and it gained
some short-term advantages from the French
Government financing the restoration of the
Hanoi Opera House and modernizing the
National Library and adjacent Archives
Depot no. 1. In November 2006, Hanoi
hosted the 14th APEC Economic Leaders’
Meeting, the most significant gathering of
foreign leaders ever to occur in Vietnam.
It was during the preparations for the
APEC meeting that the archaeological
remains of a citadel dating back to the 7th
century were uncovered in the monumental
Ba Dinh area, a discovery that inconve-
niently challenged the founding story of Ly
Thai Tho’s 1010 decision to create his capital
at Hanoi. But, as I have pointed out else-
where (Logan, 2006, p. 56), even state power
can be brought to a standstill by culture on
occasions. The remains were struck while
excavations were being made in 2002 to
enlarge the State Assembly to hold the
APEC meeting. Construction work ceased
while the archaeologists explored, and the
millennial birthday message was quickly
reshaped to emphasize the longevity of the
nation and the continuity of settlement at
Hanoi. A new building was erected instead
in the southern outskirts of the city, served
APEC apparently well, but has now been
designated as a national conference centre. At
the time of writing (September 2007), a
competition is being conducted to find the
best design for a new State Assembly in Ba
Dinh Square, a design that does not intrude
upon the archaeological site. The Thang
Long-Hanoi citadel is now being proposed
for UNESCO World Heritage listing with
the hope that inscription will be announced
to coincide with the 1000th birthday party
(Figure 1).
Another extremely ambitious example of
urban planning is currently afoot to improve
Hanoi’s image as the grand capital of a great,
civilized and prosperous society and a city of
international stature citizens (Viet Nam
News, 2007, p. 2). This plan—to renew the
swathe of territory between Red River
and the principal dyke—claims to draw on
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‘international best practice’, in this case call-
ing on experts from Seoul and their experi-
ence of developing the area around the Han
River. The proposal involves removal of
nearly 90% of the existing 40,000 households
and their replacement by new modern resi-
dential areas, parks and entertainment areas;
it aims to give Hanoi a glamorous waterfront
that will measure up well against others
around the world. The initial plan was sched-
uled for completion by November 2007 with
the implementation running from 2008 to
2020. Admittedly, most of the existing hous-
ing is cramped and flood-prone and most
residents will be accommodated in  the new
residential towers, but what is surprising is
that, despite its immense scale and likely
social impacts, the proposal has gone with so
little public consultation. The media debate,
by contrast, has been quite heated, particu-
larly since public debate is not part of the
Vietnam planning tradition. Such criticism
has led the People’s Committee to insist that
it, rather than the international advisors, will
lead the project and that the scale of resident
relocation will be reduced.
Clearly, the Hanoi People’s Committee
did not think that the public had a major role
to play in planning the city. It expected to
continue its old practice of keeping a tight
rein on development, enabling the promulga-
tion and implementation of policies favour-
ing Hanoi’s economic growth and creating
the trappings of power, including the
symbolic townscape. The expansion of top-
class infrastructure is part of the picture.
Already gated residential areas, high-rise
apartments and industrial complexes have
begun to rival those in the southern city,
and Hanoi’s fifth five-star hotel is to be
completed in 2010 with another 20 by 2020.
Despite the media controversy about the
riverside project, not much yet seems to have
changed. The People’s Committee has the ear
of the national government and is undaunted
by southern anxieties. A senior People’s
Committee official recently informed me
(21 September 2007) that very soon Hanoi
will be much bigger than Ho Chi Minh City:
a redrawing of the city boundaries, appar-
ently scheduled to take place in 2008, will see
Hanoi’s population jump overnight to more
than 10 million. This will, of course, recog-
nize the reality of Hanoi’s role as a metropol-
itan region and the long fingers of urban
development spreading out along the high-
ways towards Haiphong, Nam Dinh and
other provincial cities. It also allows for the
clearer projection of Hanoi in national and
international media as the largest Vietnamese
city, the gateway to Vietnam, Vietnam’s
‘world city’.
The Hanoi political regime is determined
to maintain its hold on the country and
strengthening the status of Hanoi is a key
strategy to this end. The capital’s political and
cultural dominance is unchallenged but
current efforts seek to make Hanoi the fast-
est-growing demographic and economic
centre—or at least to portray it as such
through the construction of monuments and
other public works and through media imag-
ery. The turmoil that hit the Vietnamese stock
Figure 1 A statue of Emperor Ly Thai To is the new 
centrepiece of the recently remodelled Indira Gandhi 
Square, part of Hanoi’s assertion of its image as the 
cradle of the Vietnamese society and state (Photograph 
by W. Logan).
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exchange in early 2008 was compounded by
global financial crisis in the second half of the
year, and economic growth rates throughout
Vietnam are falling. Nevertheless, while there
may be much concern behind the scenes and
private criticism of government interventions,
there is no apparent threat to the regime.
There are perhaps some indications, however,
that the government is becoming more
restrictive, returning to old political formulas
in face of financial uncertainty. For as long as
the regime rests on a single-party political
structure and based essentially in Hanoi,
however, there is no real threat to the city
continuing as the national capital. In over-
coming its double vulnerability, the regime
will push on with its efforts to make Hanoi
dominant both within the Vietnamese urban
hierarchy and as the country’s premier inter-
national metropolis, Vietnam’s main link to
the outside world (Figure 2).
Conclusion
Today Hanoi retains the political and much
of the cultural power, but Ho Chi Minh City
is stronger in economic and larger in popula-
tion (Hanoi 2.1 million; Ho Chi Minh City
5.1 million: 1 July 2005 estimates). Externally,
Hanoi has also struggled for recognition,
having been regarded as capital of a weak
political state that has suffered at the hands
of, successively, the Chinese and French, the
Americans and their allies, and the Soviet
Union. Renewed confrontation with China
developed into outright war in 1979 and the
growth of China on the world stage makes
for continuing uneasy neighbourly relations.
This paper argues that Hanoi’s double
vulnerability has made its rulers acutely
aware of the need to demonstrate the city’s
power as a capital city—or at least to give
the  semblance of power—through urban
Figure 2 Triumphal archway to the Ciputra Hanoi International City, a joint Indonesian-Vietnamese gated housing 
project being constructed at Xuan Dinh in Tu Liem District, a location commonly referred to as South Thang Long 
(Photograph by W. Logan).
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planning and architectural design, the build-
ing of heroic monuments and the naming of
streets and other city features after key
historic events and people. Government
policy in contemporary Vietnam remains
resolutely centralized in Hanoi, maintaining
the city’s supremacy in the political and
cultural fields in spite of growing assertive-
ness from Ho Chi Minh City and working to
ensure that Hanoi catches up with the latter
in economic and demographic terms.
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